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Women’s organising and the conflict in Iraq since 20031
 
Introduction 
The ongoing conflict in Iraq and escalating violence since the invasion in 2003 has 
unfolded against the backdrop of a society and an economy decimated by over a 
decade of comprehensive sanctions, previous wars and militarization, in addition to a 
civil society destroyed by decades of brutal dictatorship (Al-Ali, 2007; Dodge, 2005; 
Sluglett & Farouk-Sluglett, 2001). Communal and sectarian tensions were fostered by 
the previous regime as well as by the political opposition in exile prior to 2003, but 
the systematic destruction of national institutions, such as the army and the police, as 
well as other decisions taken by the occupation authorities, have led to a rapid 
expansion in communal, tribal and sectarian religious identities and, more 
significantly, their incorporation into political structures and institutions emerging 
since the US-led invasion (Dodge, 2005; Herring & Rangwala, 2006). Various 
political groups, including the former opposition in exile that dominate the central 
government, as well as those that have formed to resist the occupation and/or central 
government, have each targeted women and gender relations, through measures 
ranging between legislation and the use of physical violence, as part of their political 
projects to gain authority (Al-Ali & Pratt 2006; Al-Ali & Pratt 2007). It is within this 
context of occupation, fragmenting authority, competing visions of the political future 
of Iraq, growing conservative gender ideologies, militarization and widespread 
violence, including different forms of violence against women, that Iraqi women 
activists, both inside Iraq and from the diaspora, organise.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on research conducted in the UK, USA, Jordan and Iraq amongst 
women activists, practitioners in international organisations and NGOs, as well as 
government officials, for a larger project, entitled ‘the role of women and gender in 
the political transition in Iraq’, and funded by a grant from the British Academy. The 
authors wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments on 
an earlier version of this article and the support and encouragement of Amal Treacher. 
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In this article, we will examine the development of the women’s movement in Iraq 
since 2003. We will describe the types of activities and the strategies of different 
women activists, as well as highlight the main divisions. The article also discusses the 
various ways in which the ongoing conflict in Iraq has shaped women’s activism and 
the object of their struggles. Finally, we will attempt to evaluate women’s activism in 
terms of its contributions to national reconciliation.  
 
 
1. Creation of women’s organizations after the fall of the Ba‘th regime 
Women’s organisations have existed in Iraq ever since the creation of the Iraqi state 
under the British mandate in 1920. They were formed by the wives of the elite who 
embraced the idea of ‘the new woman’ and established the first Iraqi women’s 
movement entitled the Women’s Awakening (Nahda al-Nisa’). Women activists at 
the time mainly engaged in charity work, but also advocated for women’s education, 
leading to the establishment of the first women’s college in Iraq in the 1930s. During 
the 1930s, women’s associations set up charitable organizations, including shelters for 
orphans and health centres, to address the growing ‘social question’ and lack of 
welfare provision by the state (Kamp, 2003). The movement for women’s rights 
gathered momentum in the 1940s and 1950s as part of the revolutionary movement 
against the monarchy and continuing British influence over Iraqi politics. In the early 
1950s, the League for the Defence of Iraqi Women’s Rights (Rabitat al-difa‘ ‘an 
huquq al-mara’)2 was established by female members of the Iraqi Communist Party 
and quickly began to gain influence and following. The League contributed to the 
passage of a unified personal status code in 1959, which was regarded as a 
progressive step for women’s rights. During the post-revolutionary years (1958-1963), 
the Iraqi Women’s League played an important role as a vehicle for reforms and 
modernization.   
 
Women’s public organising was practically eliminated under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, except for the Ba‘th-sponsored General Federation of Iraqi Women (Ittihad 
                                                 
2 The name was changed in 1961 to the Iraqi Women’s League (Rabitat al-mara’ 
al‘iraqiya). 
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al-‘am li-nisa’ al-‘iraq), although some women continued to participate in 
underground movements linked to opposition political parties. The creation of the safe 
haven in the Kurdish north of Iraq in 1991 enabled Kurdish women, who already had 
a long history of activism within political parties, to increase their involvement 
through participation in women’s unions, women’s organisations and groups not 
linked to political parties. For women in the centre and south of Iraq, the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003 represents the major turning point in the creation of new 
organisations and groups, including women’s groups and networks.  
 
 Women’s organisations inside Iraq are simultaneously involved in trying to address 
practical needs while pursuing more strategic lobbying and campaigning. In terms of 
‘strategic’ interests, women have mobilised to protect and to further women’s rights 
and participation in public life. In particular, they have campaigned 1) against 
attempts to replace the relatively progressive personal status law governing marriage, 
divorce and child custody with a more conservative law (Decree 137 issued by the 
Interim Governing Council at the end of 2003, and Article 41 of the new constitution, 
ratified in 2005 but which is under review for reasons of national reconciliation)3; 2) 
to include a women’s quota of elected representatives in central, regional and local 
                                                 
3 Although Decree 137 was overturned, it found its way unto the current constitution 
in the form of Article 41. This article does not explicitly overturn the unified personal 
status code but stipulates that personal status issues will be determined by each 
religious sect, thereby giving authority to religious leaders to define laws according to 
their beliefs and particular interpretations. It provides no safeguards against extremely 
regressive and discriminatory interpretations of Islamic law, such as existed under the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Moreover, Article 41 will make future mixed marriages 
virtually impossible and could threaten already existing ones. Most significantly, it 
will contribute to the hardening of communal identities, possibly even fuelling 
sectarian violence.   
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government; 3) against Islamist encroachment by political parties and militias;  4) to 
limit the constitutional role of Islam to include constitutional guarantees that 
legislation complies with international conventions, including CEDAW; and 5) 
against the targeted assassinations of professional women and women rights activists. 
In terms of ‘practical’ interests, Iraqi women’s groups have organised training for 
women in vocational skills and income-generation activities, from bee-keeping to 
tailoring, as well as providing healthcare services, such as mobile clinics, and 
humanitarian relief to women and their families.  
 
In the wake of the fall of the Ba‘th regime, hundreds of women’s organisations 
mushroomed in the centre and south of Iraq, adding to the already significant numbers 
in the Kurdish region, such as, Al-Amal, Women Empowerment Organisation, Rewan 
Women Centre, as well as the women’s unions linked to different political parties in 
the Kurdish region. While there are no reliable statistics available, all observers are in 
agreement that the number of new civil society organisations, including NGOs and 
political parties, formed in the aftermath of the invasion reaches into the hundreds. Of 
these, a significant number were women’s organisations, such as the National Council 
of Women, the 1000 Women’s Conference, the Society of Iraqi Women for the 
Future, and the Iraqi Independent Women’s Group, to mention only a few. As one 
NGO worker who had been in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of the fall of 
Saddam, told Nicola, ‘Iraqi women's organizations got themselves organized much 
faster than anyone else’.  
 
The majority of women activists we interviewed were motivated by real needs on the 
ground combined with a desire to take advantage of newly-acquired freedoms of 
association, rather than the availability of funding from US and other 
governmental/non-governmental agencies. Indeed, initially following the fall of the 
Ba‘th regime, ‘there were so many people [in US government agencies] talking about 
the importance [of women’s participation] that it was hard at first to recognize that 
few of them had any resources to put to the issue’, the same NGO worker commented 
to Nicola. Small sums of money became available through the Office of Transition 
Initiatives (part of the US Agency for International Development--USAID), whilst 
other US-funded programmes (for example, through the United States Institute for 
Peace, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Research Triangle Institute) 
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attempted to ensure that women made up a particular percentage (usually around 
30%) of the beneficiaries of training sessions and seminars, for example. The 
Women’s Affairs Office in the Coalition Provisional Authority acted as a clearing 
house, linking newly-created women’s organizations with available seed money, 
rather than having a dedicated budget for promoting women’s participation. It also put 
a lot of effort into obtaining buildings to establish women’s centres—places where 
women could get training in vocational and/or professional skills, as well as seeking 
legal advice. However, many Iraqi women were afraid to attend the centres, which 
were associated with the occupation, and often regarded with suspicion, if not as a 
target for insurgents, by the respective local communities.  
 
In March 2004, the US announced, to much fanfare, a $10 million ‘Women’s 
Democracy Initiative’, which provided grants to NGOs to carry out so-called 
democracy education, leadership training, political training, NGO coalition-building, 
organizational management, media training and, teaching entrepreneurship (Office of 
the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues 2004). These grants were 
distributed to seven, US-based, organizations/groups of organizations, including the 
neo-conservative Independent Women’s Forum, Johns Hopkins School of Strategic 
and International Studies and Kurdish Human Rights Watch. According to Under 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, the initiative aimed ‘to help 
women become full and vibrant partners in Iraq’s developing democracy’ (USINFO 
2004). Several women activists, who, in 2004, took part enthusiastically in workshops 
and campaigns to promote voter education, since feel bitter or frustrated by US 
attempts to promote democracy in Iraq according to a short timetable. Sumaya H. told 
Nadje in 2007: ‘We did not need democracy training in five star hotels. We needed  
humanitarian assistance and a proper political process.’ Similarly, Shahrzad Mojab 
finds a huge gap between the types of programmes implemented by some women’s 
organisations and funded by foreign donors in Iraqi Kurdistan, on the one hand, and 
the actual poverty and marginalization experienced by a significant percentage of 
Kurdish women, on the other (Mojab 2007).   
 
 
The women involved in women’s organisations tend to be urban-based, middle-class 
women, of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Nevertheless, some of the 
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organisations have a broad membership and have branches throughout the country. 
The Iraqi Women’s Network (Al-Shabaka), for example, consists of over 80 women’s 
grassroots organizations which are spread throughout Iraq. The activities of the 
constituent organisations address both ‘practical’ and ‘strategic’ interests. Al-Shabaka 
demonstrates how women rights activists can work across political differences 
(whether in terms of their political party ties or lack thereof), as well as their specific 
attitudes vis a vis the US occupation. Some ask for an immediate withdrawal of troops 
viewing the occupation as responsible for the escalating violence and a failed 
government, others prefer to call for a concrete timetable of withdrawal, whilst some 
prefer the US and UK troops to remain out of fear of Islamist militancy and terrorism. 
Meanwhile, they have been united in their opposition to Article 41 of the constitution 
and in calling for guarantees for women’s rights based on CEDAW. 
 
In particular, the campaign around the personal status law has contributed to 
mobilising an Iraqi women’s movement. As a result of the passing of Decree 137, in 
late 2003, thousands of women in Baghdad and the Kurdish region protested, calling 
for the decree to be repealed (‘Iraqi Women Divided’ 2004). This moment of upsurge 
in women’s activism has been identified as an important turning point for the Iraqi 
women’s movement. It contributed to coalescing women in defence of their rights and 
gave an impetus to the lobbying for a woman’s quota (of 40%) in a future elected 
assembly. Women’s protests contributed to overturning Decree 137, to ensuring the 
inclusion of a 25% quota (a compromise figure) in the Transitional Administrative 
Law, signed in March 2004, (and later the permanent constitution) and to the 
appointment of six women cabinet ministers and seven deputy ministers within the 
transitional government of Iyad Allawi (30 June 2004-7 April 2005). 
 
However, there exist some divisions amongst Iraqi women activists, which represent 
obstacles to the creation of a unified movement. One of these divisions concerns the 
involvement of women from the diaspora. Following the fall of the regime in April 
2003, several Iraqi women from the diaspora returned to Iraq to encourage Iraqi 
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women’s political mobilization. Nawal K.,4 an activist involved in the women’s 
movement from its early stages in 2003, commented to Nadje with a tone of 
bitterness: 
 
There are those organisations that are initiated by women from the 
outside. Many of the leading activists lived in exile for many years. 
They do not really know what is going on inside. Many of these women 
are close to male political leaders and are part of the Iraqi bourgeoisie. 
So there are all these groups that are linked to political parties and male 
politicians. But then we have real grassroots organisations as well. 
Women who know what is going on and do not fear to get their hands 
dirty. They don’t just sit in fancy hotels and talk.  Even some of the 
women who came from outside are involved in these.  
 
In addition to some evidence of divisions between local and diaspora activists, 
women also differ over the role of religion in public life. Reem H., a journalist 
who was linked to the Iraqi Women’s League in the 1980s, told Nicola, ‘This 
division, between Islamist women and secular women, is new in Iraq. There 
were never these divisions before’. This divide has been made particularly 
apparent with regard to debates over the personal status law. Women associated 
with the Shi‘i Islamist parties of al-Dawa‘ and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi 
Council (SIIC, formerly known as SCIRI or the Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq) have protested in favour of placing family law under 
religious jurisdiction (‘Iraqi Women Divided’ 2004), whilst women elected on 
the United Iraqi Alliance list have also supported measures that Suzan R., a 
member of parliament in Baghdad, sees as ‘against their interests [as women]’.  
 
In response, some secular-oriented women rights activists have not been eager or, in 
some cases, able to find common ground and make strategic alliances with women 
from religious parties, seeing the situation as a zero-sum game. Radwa F., the founder 
                                                 
4 All names have been changed to protect the anonymity of the women activists 
interviewed. 
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of a women’s organisation in the Kurdish region, told Nicola that, ‘the majority of 
women’s organisations in the rest of Iraq want to introduce Islam into public life, but 
this threatens women’s rights and democracy. … Now we are scared that the religious 
parties will take away our rights in Kurdistan’. Indeed, the large number of Islamist 
women who make up parliament (as part of the United Iraqi Alliance bloc) has led 
some secular-oriented women to question the benefits of a women’s quota.  
 
Nevertheless, despite quite fundamental differences over the nature of ‘strategic 
gender interests’, some women are working across the religious/secular divide on the 
basis of shared ‘practical gender interests’. For example, in the parliament in 
Baghdad, attempts to create a women’s caucus failed in 2006. However, at the time of 
writing, some women MPs are attempting to cooperate based on ‘things that we agree 
upon, [such as] trying to improve ourselves through training, networking with other 
Arab women parliamentarians and trying to get more responsibilities in our own 
parties and in the parliamentary committees’, as Suzan R. stated over coffee in the 
lobby of a hotel in her constituency in Kurdistan. Similarly, at the level of one 
provincial council, women from Islamist and secular parties have been working 
together to promote women’s socio-economic conditions, which, as provincial council 
member Jailan A.Q. told Nicola, ‘is a material question and not an ideological one’. 
 
 
2. The impact of the conflict on women’s organising 
One of the most pressing obstacles to the women’s movement in Iraq has been the 
increasing violence and lawlessness since the fall of the regime. Measures taken by 
the occupation authorities to disband the army and police force, coupled with the slow 
progress in training new soldiers and police officers, have had devastating 
consequences for the security of ordinary men and women.  Whilst men constitute the 
majority of victims of violence, the lack of security impacts upon women in particular 
ways. Violence against women has increased since the immediate post-invasion 
chaos, when an alarming number of cases of sexual violence and abductions of 
women and girls were identified in Baghdad alone (Human Rights Watch 2003). 
Women have been abducted by gangs, raped, beaten and their bodies dumped or they 
are sold into prostitution (Ibid; Al-Jazeera 2006). If they manage to survive the ordeal, 
the stigma attached to rape deters women from coming forward to report cases of 
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sexual violence. They could be killed by their families in order to protect their 
‘honour’. Many women activists have been threatened and/or assassinated by various 
armed groups, including the increasingly powerful Islamist militias and insurgent 
groups. Regarded as bearers of the moral purity of their families and even their 
communities, women’s experience of violence and the threat of violence differentiates 
them from men. Women are afraid to travel to seek healthcare, education, to work or 
even to leave the house to do shopping, let alone to participate in public activism. 
 
The sources of violence in Iraq are multiple. The vast majority of the violence that is 
targeted at the middle classes is perpetrated by criminal gangs, who exploit the 
security vacuum created by the US-led occupation and ease of access to small arms. 
This violence includes kidnappings, car-jackings and burglaries. The political 
violence occurs between the US-led military and Iraqi police forces, on the one hand, 
and a variety of different groups making up the insurgency, on the other, as well as 
between militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army. Hundreds of ordinary Iraqis, 
particularly men but also women, are caught in the cross-fire of the conflict between 
these groups, as well as being victims of counter-insurgency measures that violate 
basic human rights standards (the Abu Ghrayb prison torture being the most widely-
publicised case). There is also the intimidation, harassment and targeted 
assassinations carried out by militia groups linked to various political parties who are 
in government. 
 
For women activists, the risk of being a victim of violence and/or intimidation 
becomes higher as their involvement in public life challenges the views of Islamist 
militia and insurgent groups with regard to appropriate gender relations and gender 
roles. In particular, women’s participation in the public sphere is seen by some 
Islamists to symbolise western cultural encroachment of Iraq, as well as being 
associated with the perceived secular nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The context 
of foreign occupation has helped to create an intensification of conservative gender 
ideologies, which are promoted not only by armed Islamist groups but also political 
parties in government.  
 
Many women activists have left the country or have sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan 
after receiving death threats from armed groups. Those who remain in central and 
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south Iraq often fear for their lives and those of their families and friends on a daily 
basis. The official police force and the national government have done little to protect 
women. Indeed, many Iraqis have no trust in the police to provide security to ordinary 
people and see them as focusing on implementing the US-led counter-insurgency 
measures. Consequently, meetings between women activists have become virtually 
impossible and women activists are forced to risk their lives to travel to neighbouring 
Jordan to participate in meetings and conferences. Men (for example, university 
professors and medical doctors) are also similarly targeted by Islamist militia and 
insurgents. However, the perception that women are somehow more vulnerable makes 
it more likely that threats of violence will lead women to abandon public 
participation. 
 
Obviously, this impacts tremendously on the ability to sustain women’s activism in 
Iraq. Women activists in the south and central Iraq perceive the ongoing violence as 
the biggest obstacle to their work. Even in Iraqi Kurdistan, which, at the time of 
writing, is largely unaffected by violence, women activists emphasize the ongoing 
conflict in the rest of Iraq as a barrier to networking with women there. Women 
activists see different reasons behind the violence, including the US/UK occupation 
and counter-insurgency measures, the conflict between different militias, the 
sectarianism of different political leaders, the ineffectiveness of the police, the poor 
socio-economic conditions that drive young men to join armed groups, as well as the 
terrorism perpetrated by former regime loyalists and Al-Qaeda-led foreign fighters.  
All of these sources of violence are interlinked, as the invasion and occupation have 
created the conditions for the growth in power of communally-based political groups 
who use conservative gender ideologies in the process of asserting their authority 
against rivals, as well as the widespread availability of small arms, high 
unemployment and deteriorating humanitarian conditions.  
 
3. Iraqi women’s activism: Source of conflict or reconciliation? 
 
In light of the devastating impact of violence on the development of Iraq, some 
women’s groups have addressed their activism to this question. However, Iraqi 
women are not in agreement over the ways in which this reconciliation may be 
achieved. In particular, there are differences of opinion over the continuing presence 
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of US troops. On the one hand, some women believe that US troops are necessary to 
defeat the Islamist militias and stop the sectarian violence, whilst other women see US 
troops as a source of this violence and call for the immediate withdrawal of coalition 
troops and an end to the occupation.  
 
However, these differences do not appear to prevent women inside Iraq from working 
together, unlike many women activists in the diaspora, who tend to be extremely 
polarized in their opinions about the occupation. Members of the Iraqi Women’s 
Network (al-Shabaka), for example, which consists of over 80 different women’s 
organisations, work across differences in terms of demanding an immediate 
withdrawal of troops, a schedule for withdrawal, or a future withdrawal after the 
establishment of greater security and law and order.     
 
Some women’s organisations in the diaspora may also contribute more actively to 
constructing sectarian divisions and tensions by engaging in identity politics and 
stressing the specific suffering and plight of their ethnic and or religious group, while 
dismissing that of others. This was evident amongst Islamist Shi’i women in Dearborn 
who were linked to the Dawa party, Kurdish women activists in San Diego and 
Assyrian women activists in London that Nadje interviewed. Identity politics appear 
to be particularly significant amongst Iraqi diaspora women in the US, where the 
overall political climate and discourse appears to promote an assertion of communal 
identities—although the assertion of ethnic and religious identities can be found 
throughout the diaspora as well as increasingly inside Iraq, where a de facto 
confessional political system has emerged and the destruction of Iraqi state 
institutions has led to the weakening of a national Iraqi identity.  
 
However, despite differences of opinion with regards to the US presence in Iraq, 
women activists inside Iraq have been at the forefront of expressing their opposition 
to sectarian politics. Several initiatives, campaigns, conferences and networks attempt 
to promote national unity and reconciliation. The vast majority of women’s groups 
disavow sectarianism and do not regard sectarian divisions as characterising the 
woman’s movement. The attempt to stem sectarianism has been one of the reasons 
why secular-oriented women activists have campaigned against the replacement of the 
unified personal status code. Article 41 (and its predecessor, Decree 137) not only 
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threatens women’s rights by placing personal status issues under the control of 
religious leaders. In addition, by stating that ‘Iraqis are free in their adherence to their 
personal status according to their own religion, sect, belief and choice’, this article 
potentially contributes to sectarian tensions and divisions as it is based on and meant 
to reify communal and religious differences. In light of the link between communal 
identities, political competition and violence, including violence against women, and 
conservative gender ideologies, the future of Iraqi personal status laws is critical for 
the future of women’s rights and eradication of sectarian differences. 
 
Yet, opposition to Article 41 has highlighted splits amongst Iraqi women activists. As 
noted above, Islamist women activists have demonstrated support for the repeal of a 
unified personal status code. Although these divisions are generally expressed in 
terms of secular vs. religious, there are times when positions towards Islam in public 
life become entwined with sectarian identifications. For example, Leila T., employed 
by a US NGO in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003, told Nicola, ‘In the Iraqi constitution, 
they talk about the role of sharia and allowing polygamy. In the south of Iraq, they 
don’t think that this is a problem. Only in the north are we asking for women’s rights 
in the constitution. Only the Kurdish parties are asking for women’s rights’. 
  
The perception by some women that women’s rights will be protected by the Kurdish 
parties (against attempts by “Arab” Iraqis in the rest of the country to impose sharia) 
is a boost to the credibility of the Kurdish national leaders, who, nevertheless, are part 
of the process of sectarian politics conducted at the national level. Indeed, several 
women activists have stated that whilst Kurdish political leaders have voiced their 
opposition to Article 41, there are also fears that they would be willing to “trade” this 
opposition for Kurdish control over the city of Kirkuk and its province. 
 
The sectarian nature of Iraqi politics on the national level considerably narrows the 
possibility for non-sectarian initiatives by women’s groups. The party list system for 
elections to national, regional and local bodies contributes to stifling independent 
voices that may challenge sectarian-based politics. Reem S., the founder of a woman’s 
organisation in the south of Iraq and a member of ‘al-Shabaka’, told Nicola that she 
was forced to cede defeat in local elections, despite winning more votes than some of 
the party-affiliated candidates, after getting death threats from Islamist militia in her 
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town. ‘They think I’m a threat because I am not a member of any party’. Meanwhile, 
Aida A., a member of parliament in Baghdad, addressing a roundtable discussion in 
London, lamented that, ‘Women feel most vulnerable because they are not part of 
militias and are not protected by militias. […] These militias are in parliament and 
they are close to government’.   
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In the post-invasion period, political spaces initially opened up for women activists 
but have since been severely curtailed, if not largely eradicated, by the increasing 
violence, rooted in military intervention, continuous misjudgement and reckless 
incompetence by the occupation, sectarian politics and competition for authority in 
the new Iraq, as well as resistance to US occupation. Those women activists closely 
linked to political parties and influential male politicians have been able to carve out 
spaces for themselves and continue to be involved in processes related to political 
transition and reconstruction. However, the vast majority of women activists have 
been marginalized, silenced or forced into low profile activism. Nevertheless, there 
are women who continue to be active and have attempted to work across divisions and 
to promote national reconciliation, in particular with regards to women’s ‘practical 
interests’. However, identifying women’s strategic interests continues to divide 
women along religious/secular lines, and sometimes along religious and ethnic lines.     
 
The links between foreign occupation, on the one hand, and conservative gender 
ideologies, sectarian identities and violence, on the other, highlight the importance of 
conceptualizing ‘strategic gender interests’ not only in terms of women’s rights and 
women’s participation but, equally, in terms of engaging with the wider political and 
military context that gives rise to militant Islamism, sectarian and ethnic politics, and 
massive insecurities, since these operate to undermine women’s rights. Without a 
consensus over the causes of violence, sectarian and ethnic-based politics and 
conservative gender ideologies, women activists’ attempts at national reconciliation 
remain limited.  
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